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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-16. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Primary Issues: 
1. Can the Use Tax apply to a transaction occurring entirely within 
the State of Utah which is not subject to Sales Tax? 
2. Is the act of installation or conversion of materials to real property 
by a non-exempt contractor subject to a Use Tax if the contractor did not own the 
materials installed or converted? 
Secondary Issues: 
3. Can an administrative agency change a longstanding interpretation 
of a tax statute, as recognized by Supreme Court opinion, practice and longstanding 
regulations, absent any change in law or an indication of change in legislative intent? 
4. If the act of installation or conversion by a contractor of materials 
to real property owned by an exempt entity constitutes an independent taxable event 
for Use Tax purposes, does the incidence of tax fall upon the purchaser, general 
contractor, or upon the subcontractor? 
5. If the act of installation or conversion by a contractor of material 
to real property owned by a tax exempt entity constitutes a separate taxable event for 
Use Tax purposes, is the amount of Sales Tax measured by the amount paid in 
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connection with such event, or is the Sales Tax to be measured by the amount paid by 
the exempt entity to an unrelated third party in a separate event? 
6. Is the Commission's Decision invalid because it is based on 
conflicting and inconsistent criteria which are not founded on statutory authority and 
which are inconsistently applied? 
7. If the Commission's Decision is ultimately upheld, does equity 
require that the change in law be applied prospectively? 
The applicable standard of review for each issue is the correction-of-error 
standard. Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). This 
appeal presents questions of law. Accordingly, the Court should review the 
Commission's ruling for correctness but accord the Commission's findings with respect 
to law no particular deference. The reviewing court is free to render an independent 
interpretation of the questions of law at issue in this case. Ron K. Case Roofing & 
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This case depends upon the interpretation of the following statutes and 
Tax Commission rules the relevant portions of which are set forth at length in the 
Addendum attached hereto: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104. 
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-42S 
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-43S 
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this review proceeding, petitioner seeks a redetermination of the Use 
Tax assessed against it by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The tax deficiency was assessed against petitioner for building materials that petitioner 
incorporated into the construction of the LDS Print Center constructed for the 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
and into two elementary school buildings constructed for the Granite School District. 
Petitioner requested redetermination below on the grounds that the 
materials in question were purchased directly by the owners, both tax exempt entities, 
and that the transactions were therefore exempt from any tax, including Use Tax. The 
parties conducted discovery, and the Commission held a formal evidentiary hearing on 
the issues on August 27t 28 and 29, 1991. The Commission thereafter entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision upholding the deficiency 
assessment expressly as Use Tax. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review 
with this court. This brief addresses the Use Tax assessment as it relates to the 
building constructed for the Church. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Procedural History. 
Arco is an electrical contractor which has been in business since 
approximately 1980. (August 28, 1991 Granite School Hearing Transcript, "Gr.Tr.", 
Add.Ex. 3, p.32, In.18.) During 1986 Arco entered into contracts or subcontracts to 
furnish and/or install electrical equipment in construction projects at four locations on 
behalf of three separate entities (the "Owners"). These projects and Owners were: (1) 
a print center constructed for the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "Church"); (2) a physical facilities building 
constructed for the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"); and (3) two elementary school 
buildings constructed for the Granite School District ("Granite"). The Church, UTA 
and Granite are all tax-exempt entities, the Church being a religious and charitable 
organization, and UTA and Granite being political subdivisions of the State of Utah. 
These three construction projects were separate and distinct from each 
other. (Gen.Doc.R.67, Add.Ex. 1, p.2.) Separate contract documents were entered 
into for each project between the Owner and a general contractor or subcontractor. 
(Gen.Doc.R. 68,72,78, Add.Ex. 1, pp.3,7,13.) The common threads in these three 
projects are (1) Arco installed materials on each project, (2) part of the materials were 
originally purchased by the Owner, an exempt entity, without payment of Sales Tax, 
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and (3) the Auditing Division assessed a deficiency against Arco with respect to some 
or all of the materials bought by (or in the name of) the tax exempt entity. 
There are many similarities in what happened with each contract, and in 
most applicable principles of law. However, there are also certain material differences 
in the fact situations, contract documents and applicable law relating specifically to the 
three entities. 
In order to avoid confusion with respect to these material differences 
(and recognizing that, as a result of indemnity agreements between each exempt entity 
and Arco, the Owners were the real parties in economic interest), the Commission 
treated this case as actually being three cases. (Gen.Doc.R. 67, Add.Ex. 1, p.2.) 
Hearings were held on three separate days, with a different exempt Owner being the 
focus of each day. (Gen.Doc.R. 66, Add.Ex. 1, p.l.) The Commission entered three 
separate Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, ultimately finding a Use Tax 
deficiency with respect to the materials used on the construction projects of the Church 
and Granite, but holding no tax due with respect to the materials purchased in the 
name of UTA (Gen.Doc.R. 102-103, Add.Ex. 1, p.37-38.) 
Thereafter the Church and Granite paid the portions of Arco's deficiency 
with respect to their projects, and filed this appeal on behalf of Arco. Neither UTA 
nor the Commission have appealed the holding with respect to UTA. 
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Recognizing that this case is really two cases, separate briefs are being 
filed by the Church and Granite. This brief is on behalf of the Church and relates 
specifically to that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made by the 
Church, although most of the legal argument applies to Granite also. 
B. Facts Relating to Materials for the Church's Project. 
In 1986, the Church entered into a contract with Interwest Construction 
Company ("Interwest") as general contractor to construct a printing center (the "Print 
Center"). (Gen.Doc.R. 78, Add.Ex. 1, p. 13.) Interwest subcontracted with Arco to do 
the electrical work, subject to the same general terms and conditions as Interwest. 
(Gen.Doc.R. 78, Add.Ex. 1, p. 13.) For convenience, unless otherwise stated, the term 
"Contractor" will be used in connection with those contract provisions applying both to 
Interwest and Arco. 
The contract provided for the Contractor to install four classes of Church-
owned materials (the "Church Materials"). These classes of materials were: (1) 
materials already owned by the Church and used in the previous printing center; (2) a 
multi-million dollar press which was specially ordered for the Prim Center before the 
contract was signed; (3) materials which the initial contract indicated were prebid and 
already purchased; and (4) additional materials which the Church provided through 
change orders issued pursuant to the contract terms during the construction of the 
Print Center. All other materials used in the construction of the Print Center were 
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purchased by the Contractor and a sales tax was paid by the Contractor, and all parties 
agree that such tax was properly the Contractor's duty. 
The Commission noted at the hearing that the first three classes of 
materials purchased or in the possession of the Church were tax exempt (August 29, 
1991 Church Hearing Transcript "Ch.Tr.", Add.Ex. 4, p.78, ln.8-25), but nevertheless 
found the fourth class of materials purchased by the Church to be subject to a Use 
Tax which the Commission imposed on Arco. (Gen.Doc.R. 102, Add.Ex. 1, p.37.) The 
fourth class of materials upon which the Commission imposed the tax will be referred 
to as "Change Order Materials." 
All Change Order Materials were acquired pursuant to rights reserved in 
the contract. (Gen.Doc.R. 79, Add.Ex. 1, p.14.) Exercising its option to purchase 
materials for use in the construction of the Print Center (Gen.Doc.R. 81, Add.Ex. 1, 
p. 16), the Church first secured material lists from the Contractors. (Gen.Doc.R. 81, 
Add.Ex. 1, p. 16.) Arco then prepared a purchase order which was reviewed by the 
Contractors and Church Purchasing. When all was in order, Church Purchasing issued 
the purchase order directly to the vendor. (Gen.Doc.R. 81, Add.Ex. 1, p. 16.) 
The vendors delivered materials to the job site and billed the Church 
directly. (Gen.Doc.R. 81-82, Add.Ex. 1, pp.16-17.) After verification of invoices, the 
Church made payment directly to the vendors (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p. 17), a 
change order was issued crediting the Church for the cost of the materials (Gen.Doc.R. 
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82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17), and the Contractor was relieved of the duty to furnish those 
materials. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, pp.40-41, ln.17-1; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.56, ln.3-9.) 
This procedure was conducted in accordance with the terms of the 
contract, and its implementation substantially modified the relationship of the parties 
with respect to the Change Order Materials. Both vendors and Contractors considered 
the Church to be the purchaser of the Change Order Materials (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, 
p. 19, In. 12-25), and the parties recognized that it was up to the Church to ultimately 
determine what to purchase and from whom to purchase. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, p.38, 
In. 1-25; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.20, In. 21-24.) Title to those materials passed directly 
from the vendors to the Church. (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17.) Vendors looked 
solely to the Church for payment. (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17.) The standard 
10% retainage withheld by the Owner was not withheld on the materials. (Gen.Doc.R. 
82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17.) Bids by vendors were based on the credit ratings of the exempt 
entities rather than the ratings of the Contractors. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, p.28, In. 3-9.) 
Warranties on the purchased materials ran to the Church. (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, 
p.17.) Surplus Change Order Materials belonged to and were retained by the Church 
(Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, p.46, ln.2-10; Ch. Tr. p. 15, In. 15-25), and when the wrong light 
fixtures were ordered and paid for by the Church, the Church was required to provide 
the replacement light fixtures. (Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.16 ln.1-19.) 
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Similar to the procedures of the Church, the UTA contract initially 
required Arco to furnish supplies and materials. (Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31.) 
Like the Church, the contract provisions allowed for owner purchased materials. 
(Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31.) In contrast to the procedures used by the Church, 
UTA did not issue purchase orders until after most of the materials had already been 
ordered and delivered (Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31), and at least one of the 
suppliers billed Arco directly for the materials. (Gen.Doc.R. p.96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31.) 
After the Church-purchased material was delivered to the job site (Ch.Tr., 
Add.Ex. 4, p.25 In. 16-20), the Contractors' duties with respect to receiving and installing 
the materials were the same regardless of whether the material was one of the other 
three categories of Church Materials or Change Order Materials. (Gen.Doc.R. 78, 
Add.Ex. 1, p.13; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.25 ln.21 to p.26 ln.16; p.53 ln.1-21; and p.56 ln.20-
23.) 
This pattern of bidding and modifying the contract was adopted to allow 
the Church to avail itself of the Sales and Use Tax exemption long granted for 
materials it buys as tangible personal property which are then installed by someone 
other than the seller. As of the date the contract was entered into in 1986, this 
practice was common among contractors and had been used in connection with a 
number of exempt entities over many years. (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, pp.18-19, 119-120, 137, 
168-9; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.47.) 
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However, when the Auditing Division conducted its audits of Utah 
contractors with respect to 1986 and 1987, the Division decided to depart from the 
historical position of the Commission. (Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.94 ln.10-21.) The result 
was more than 30 contractors suddenly being assessed taxes on materials purchased by 
exempt entities. 
At the hearing before the Commission, the Auditing Division contended 
that because Arco installed such materials into the physical structure, Arco could be 
considered to have "used or consumed" the materials at issue. The Auditing Division 
then argued that such consumption was a taxable use of the materials under the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(l). 
Conversely, Arco contended that the Church, UTA and Granite were the 
purchasers of all the materials at issue and that no Sales and Use Tax was owing 
because sales to religious and charitable organizations and political subdivisions are 
exempt from Sales and Use Tax by statute. 
After the hearing, the Commission concluded that if a tax-exempt entity 
purchases an item for conversion to real property by another person or entity, the item 
is not exempt from Sales and Use Tax, because the person who converts the item to 
real property is the consumer of such item (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 1, p.29), and such 
consumption (not the original sale) is itself the taxable event (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 
1, p.29) expressly subject to the Use Tax. (Gen.Doc.R. 93, Add.Ex. 1, p.28.) The 
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Commission further concluded that the overall activities of the tax-exempt entity must 
rise to the level of a "real property contractor" before an item purchased by the 
tax-exempt entity for conversion to real property would be exempt from Sales or Use 
Tax. (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 1, p.29.) 
In applying these conclusions to the three separate construction projects 
at issue, the Commission ruled that the activities of UTA rose to the level of a "real 
property contractor" but that the activities of the Church and Granite did not. That 
portion of the Sales Tax assessment against Arco which was attributable to material 
purchased by UTA was accordingly abated, while that portion of the assessment 
attributable to purchases made by the Church and Granite was upheld as a Use Tax, 
(Gen.Doc.R. 102-103, Add.Ex. 1, pp.37-38) and this appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission's decision (the "Decision") represents a sudden departure 
from established Sales and Use Tax law in Utah as evidenced directly by the 
statements of the trial attorney (admitting the Audit Division was departing from its 
historical interpretation of the statute in order to protect the tax base) and indirectly by 
the inordinate number of taxpayers (approximately thirty) being challenged. In addition 
to ignoring the established Sales and Use Tax law, the Decision is flawed because it 
articulates conflicting rules of law, and applies the law inconsistently to the facts. 
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Utah has a firmly established rule that a tax based on the use of property 
(Le. a Use Tax) can only apply to an out-of-state transfer of title1 which is not 
otherwise exempt under the Sales Tax. The tax assessed in the instant case is a Use 
Tax on property which was purchased in Utah, but not by the taxpayer against whom 
the tax is being assessed, and in transactions expressly exempted by statute. Such a tax 
is clearly illegal because it is contrary to the intent of the Legislature and violates this 
Court's prior holdings. 
The Commission's Decision also violates general principles of statutory 
interpretation which hold that longstanding interpretations of laws are impliedly 
adopted by the Legislature. Thus, in the absence of legislative enactments, the 
Commission does not have authority to abandon its historic position in a way which 
prevents utilization of an exemption by the very entities the exemption was intended to 
benefit. 
The Decision also ignores important elements of the statute in imposing 
the tax, is internally inconsistent, and has been applied inconsistently to the facts. 
The scope of the Use Tax is limited by a clear Legislative intent to 
predicate the tax upon ownership of the property used. The statutory definition of 
"use" requires such use be incident to the ownership (or a lease) of the property. 
Thus, when a contractor converts materials he has purchased, the contractor can be 
1
 The statute has subsequently been expanded to also reach leases of property, 
but leases are ignored herein since there is no lease involved in this case. 
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considered to be the user of those materials because he is the owner. However, in this 
case Arco did not own the Change Order Materials, and therefore the conversion of 
those materials on behalf of the owner is not a "use" of the materials by Arco within 
the meaning of the statute. 
Even if we ignored the statutory definition of "use" and assume arguendo 
that Arco could somehow "use" building materials it didn't own and that such non-
ownership "use" by Arco is taxable, the incidence of the tax would still not fall on Arco. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 imposes the tax upon the "purchaser," (not the "user") 
based on the "amount paid" by such "purchaser" for such use. Arco was not the 
purchaser (and therefore not the party subject to tax) because it made no purchase 
and did not have ownership. Furthermore, any constructive purchase in this case must 
be by the general contractor who is primarily responsible for the conversion of the 
personal property to realty. In addition, all payments for the alleged "use" of affixing 
the Change Order Materials flowed from the Church to Arco. Thus, if non-ownership 
"use" is a separate taxable event from the original sale to the Church, as the Commis-
sion held, then the Use Tax cannot be based on the sale amount. Instead any Use 
Tax assessed against Arco must be based on the "amount paid" by Arco for the "use" 
(i.e. conversion of the materials to realty). This amount is zero, resulting in no tax. 
The Decision is further flawed by internal inconsistency. In one 
paragraph it exempts purchases from the Sales and Use Tax if the exempt entity 
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separately hires a contractor on a "labor only" or "install only" contract, and in the very 
next paragraph states that if the property is purchased for conversion to real property 
by another person or entity the purchase is not exempt. This contradiction is repeated 
when the Decision quotes Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S.A.4, which exempts sales to 
exempt entities if the seller does not attach the property, and then later purports to 
separately tax the act of attaching personalty to realty by "anyone except an exempt 
entity." In another contradiction, the Decision first explains that actions not conforming 
to the language of the contract will not change the tax consequences because actions 
and after-the-fact statements are impossible to audit, and then later the Decision holds 
that UTA can ignore its contract and document language and rely on its actions and an 
oral explanation. 
Given the inconsistencies in the legal analysis, it is not surprising that the 
standards announced have been inconsistently applied. On the articulated findings of 
fact and stated standards, UTA had fewer features showing bona fide compliance with 
the law than the Church. Yet UTA was allowed to "explain" its perceived 
shortcomings whereas the Church and Granite were not. 
Finally, even if the Commission's change in policy can ultimately be 
upheld, it is inequitable to permit the policy change to be applied retroactively. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TAX CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON THE MERE USE OF PROPERTY 
ABSENT AN OUT-OF-STATE TRANSFER OF TITLE. 
The Commission sums up its underlying theory of the case on page 28 of 
its Decision (Gen.Doc.R. 93, App.Ex. 1, p.28) as follows: 
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of tangible personal 
property, but also upon "tangible personal property stored, used or 
consumed in this state." . . . [The] conversion of tangible personal 
property into real property is deemed to be the consumption or use of 
the tangible personal property, which is the taxable event. 
(Emphasis added.) 
From the finding that "use" of building materials is a separately taxable 
event, the Commission derived all the rest of its conclusions (which assess the tax 
based solely on who attaches the materials to real property) stating on page 29 of the 
Decision (Gen.Doc.R. 94, Add.Ex. 1, p.29): 
The party that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to 
real property has used or consumed that property. If that conversion to 
real property is performed by anyone except an exempt entity, the use 
and consumption of the converted materials is subject to sales and use 
tax. . . . 
Therefore, the primary issue in this case is to determine whether the 
Petitioner was the real property contractor or whether the [exempt 
entities were] the real property contractor. 
The Commission then determined that the Church is not the real 
property contractor and holds on Page 35 (Gen.Doc.R. 100, Add.Ex. 1, p.35) that Arco 
is therefore subject to a "Use Tax." Since the inquiry as to who is the contractor is 
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predicated upon the Commission's belief that attachment of building materials to realty 
is itself an independently taxable "use" of the materials resulting in a "Use Tax", this 
case should turn on whether the language in the Sales and Use Tax statute that 
imposes a tax on the "storage, use or consumption" of property in Utah (i.e. the Use 
Tax portion of the statute) was intended by the Legislature to impose a tax when there 
is no out-of-state transfer of title or right to the taxed property. 
This is not a new question. The Commission has merely given it a new 
answer. It was originally asked and answered in the taxpayer's favor during the 1940's 
in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 
(1942), Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 
879 (1947) and Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 
(1949). In each case, the Commission found a tax due based on the Use Tax, and in 
each case this Court looked to the legislative history and legislative intent to reject the 
tax. 
As this Court explained in those opinions, Utah's Sales Tax was originally 
adopted in 1933 as an excise on the transfer of title to personal property for a 
consideration. The Use Tax was adopted in 1937 specifically to protect Utah 
merchants who were disadvantaged because the Sales Tax could not constitutionally 
reach out-of-state purchases by Utah residents. Then, in 1942, this Court decided the 
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first of the three controlling cases, Utah Concrete Products, which both the Commission 
and the taxpayers herein claim to govern the case. 
The difference of opinion regarding Utah Concrete Products originates 
because that case involved three different situations under which personal property was 
converted into realty. The Commission appears to have considered only the language 
related to the first two situations (which the Court treated as legally identical), where 
title to the personal property was transferred to third-party contractors who in turn 
were responsible for the conversion of the materials to realty. However, the Court's 
conclusion regarding the first two situations does not support the Commission's present 
interpretation, and it is, in fact, the third situation, where there was no transfer of title, 
which is the controlling precedent. 
Citing Utah Concrete Products the Commission asserted in its Decision 
"The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that sales and use tax is imposed upon 
the party that converts tangible personal property into real property." (Gen.Doc.R. 79-
80, Add.Ex. 1, pp.14,15.) This statement is untrue. In Utah Concrete Products, this 
court affirmatively refused to tax the mere conversion of personalty to realty without a 
transfer of title (Le. the third situation), stating: 
[W]e hold that building materials used by the manufacturer for its own 
use are not subject to tax under the Use Tax Act of 1937. 
Id. at 514, 125 P.2d at 409 (Emphasis added). 
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The Commission's characterization of Utah Concrete Products also 
demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the taxable event involved in the first two 
situations. In Utah Concrete Products a tax was assessed for the value of certain 
concrete products used to improve real property. However, contrary to the assertion of 
the Commission, the tax imposed was a Sales Tax on the transfer of title, and not a 
Use Tax on the act of converting the personalty to realty. 
In reaching its holding that the Sales Tax applied, this Court indicated the 
case turned on whether the original sale by the manufacturer was a "retail sale" to the 
final consumer, or a "wholesale sale" of materials for re-sale. It was in this context that 
the Commission successfully argued that conversion of personalty to realty constituted 
"consumption" or "use" of the materials within the meaning of the Sales Tax. However, 
it was the manufacturers (and not the contractors who actually affixed the materials) 
who were held liable as retailers for the original sale of the materials. 
This Court expressly characterized the question as being whether a Sales 
Tax should be imposed in the first two situations and expressly held the tax was, in 
fact, imposed as a Sales Tax saying; 
[A]re sales of products made by a manufacturer of building materials to 
contractors for use upon a private[/public] construction contract taxable 
under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (Sales Tax Act) . . . ? 
The order complained of is hereby affirmed as to the taxation of plaintiffs 
under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, and reversed as to the tax 
imposed on plaintiff under the Use Tax Act of 1937. 
Id. at 514, 125 P.2d at 409 (Emphasis added). 
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Thus, the contractors who actually used the materials were not the parties 
made to pay the tax. The tax was clearly imposed upon the transfer of title2 by the 
manufacturers. No tax was imposed upon subsequent use of the materials by the 
contractors. In the instant case, the Commission expressly found that title to the 
materials was transferred to the Church, not Arco (Gen.Doc.R. 82, Add.Ex. 1, p.17), 
and based its assessment expressly as a Use Tax (Gen.Doc.R. 102, Add.Ex. 1, p.37) on 
the subsequent "use" of the material, not the original sale. Therefore the first two 
situations from Utah Concrete Products are inapposite. 
Instead it is the third situation which is directly dispositive of this case. 
In that situation, Utah Concrete Pipe Company built its own building out of its own 
materials. Then, as here, the Commission argued that the mere act of converting 
tangible personal property to real property was a "use" of the personalty which was 
itself a taxable event. 
This Court rejected the Commission's application of the Use Tax to these 
facts because there was no transfer of title. The Court first observed that the Use Tax 
was levied only on property which was purchased. It then observed that a "purchase" 
was defined essentially as a transfer of tangible personal property for a consideration. 
2
 Transfer of title is the sine qua non of the Sales and Use Tax. In every single 
case holding either a manufacturer or a contractor taxable on materials used in the 
construction of a building, including those cases cited by the Tax Commission, title to 
the materials was transferred to the contractor. Moreover, unless the title was 
transferred out-of-state, the court has always applied a sales tax on the transfer of title. 
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The Court then expressly held that transfer of title is a mandatory precondition to the 
application of the Use Tax stating: 
The Legislature contemplated transfer of right, title, or 
property from one person to another, and not simple 
bookkeeping entries or physical transfer from one place to 
another. 
Although the language of the statute has been modified slightly by the 
Legislature since the Utah Concrete Products decision, the modification has not affected 
the conclusion that the Use Tax still requires transfer of title as the result of a 
purchase. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 still assesses the tax against the "purchaser" 
and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) limits the term "use" in subsection 59-12-103(1) to 
exercises of right or power which are "incident to the ownership or the leasing of that 
property, item or service." (Emphasis added.) The other two cases cited by the 
Commission implicitly reinforce this conclusion. See Olson Constiiiction Company v. 
State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961) and Tummurm Trades, Inc. 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), both of which assessed tax 
against underlying purchases of materials. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Arco never received title to the 
property. Nor did Arco receive any other right, title or interest which in any way 
approached ownership. Without transfer of such right, title or interest, the mere 
attaching of personal property to real property does not constitute a transfer within the 
meaning of the Sales and Use Tax. Therefore, under Utah Concrete Products, Arco is 
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not liable for a Use Tax in connection with any building materials purchased by the 
Church, including the Change Order Materials. 
After Utah Concrete Products, this Court further restricted the Use Tax by 
holding that the mandatory transfer of title must occur outside the State of Utah. The 
first case to so hold was Union Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commission, 110 
Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947), in which this Court rejected a Use Tax on property 
purchased in Utah,3 concluding: 
The purpose of the tax was to overcome a discrimination 
found to exist in the Sales Tax, . . . caused by the inability 
to impose the Sales Tax upon transactions in interstate 
commerce . . . [and imposition of the tax] acts as a 
protection and equalization to the Utah merchant against 
out-of-state merchants who may be selling to Utah 
purchasers. 
. . . As before stated, the obvious purpose of the Use Tax 
Act was to impose a tax on the use in this state of property 
the sale of which, because the sale took place outside the 
state, was beyond the reach of the Utah Sales Tax Act. But 
when the Legislature by the specific language of the sales 
tax carves out of those sales which it has power to tax 
specific sales and exempts them from the sales tax it clearly 
evidences a desire to exempt the property so sold from the 
2% tax, whether imposed by the Use or Sales Tax Act. To 
hold otherwise would practically nullify the obvious 
legislative intent. 
3
 This case is particularly interesting because this Court originally adopted a 
position identical to the position of the Commission below based upon the literal 
language of the Use Tax (See Utah Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 
Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (Utah 1946) but then reversed itself on this issue because 
applying the Use Tax to nullify an express exemption under the Sales tax, as the 
Commission attempts to do here, is clearly contrary to legislative intent. 
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The requirement for an out-of-state transfer of title in order to follow 
legislative intent which is so clearly set out in Union Portland Cement was subsequently 
reaffirmed and emphasized in Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 
209 P.2d 208 (1949). In Geneva Steel the dissent claimed that the interpretation of the 
Court so narrowed the scope of the Use Tax Act as to make it useless or a "nullity." 
However, the majority properly observed that its decision did not nullify the Use Tax 
Act, but merely limited the Use Tax to its proper policing role to prevent property 
purchased outside the State of Utah from escaping the Sales Tax. In the Court's 
words: 
Remaining for the Use Tax to operate upon is the storage, 
use or other consumption of property purchased outside of 
this state and brought into the state for storage, use or 
consumption. 
We hold therefore, that the storage, use or other consump-
tion of property, the sale of which is made in this state and 
which is not amenable to the Sales Tax, is likewise not 
subject to the Use Tax. 
Id., at 170, 209 P.2d 208 (Emphasis added). 
Union Portland Cement and Geneva Steel plainly hold that where a 
transfer of title to materials occurs within this state there cannot be any Use Tax with 
respect to those materials. Either the initial sale is subject to the Sales Tax or it is 
not. If the sale is exempt from the Sales Tax, the subsequent use is exempt from the 
Use Tax. 
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In the instant case, all of the Change Order Materials were sold to the 
Church within the State of Utah in transactions specifically exempt under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(8). It follows from Union Portland Cement and Geneva Steel that the 
Legislature did not intend these same materials to thereafter be subject to a tax based 
solely on their being "used" in Utah, and therefore the Commission erred in assessing a 
Use Tax against Arco. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LONGSTANDING 
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 
The Commission's position in this case constitutes a major change in 
existing law and practice. There is ample testimony that the procedures followed by 
Arco in connection with UTA, Granite and the Church were routinely used by exempt 
organizations in connection with construction projects over many years without audit 
problems (Gr.Tr., Add.Ex. 3, pp.18-19, 119-120, 137, 168-9; Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.47), 
and UTA even reviewed its methods with the Commission's staff. (August 27, 1991 
UTA Hearing Transcript, Add.Ex. 5, pp.8-22.) Indeed, in closing arguments, counsel 
for the Auditing Division not only admitted that the position being articulated 
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constituted a substantial change in interpretation,4 but explained that the change was 
driven by a perceived need to protect revenues. (Ch.Tr., Add.Ex. 4, p.91, In. 20 
through p.92 In. 22.) 
Such unilateral changes are not in accordance with law. Utah Concrete 
Products held that longstanding compliance with administrative rulings lends strength to 
the presumption of a regulation's validity. The same policy considerations dictate that 
longstanding practices should also be recognized as evidencing a valid interpretation of 
a statute, particularly when those practices are in conformity with ihe plain language of 
the statute and the decisions of this Court. See Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 762 
P.2d 1119 (Utah App. 1988) citing Travelers Indent. Co. v. Barnes, 191 Colo. 278, 552 
P.2d 300, 303 (1976) ("Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a 
statute and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of 
administrative authority granted."); also citing IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296, 
4
 This was not a mere change in the level of enforcement of an established 
interpretation. Instead it constitutes a new interpretation of a statute which previously 
had a well-settled meaning. In the words of opposing counsel: 
Now there has been some talk . . . that some of these 
positions are not consistent with the position that has 
historically been taken. That's absolutely correct. They're 
not intended to be consistent with positions that have been 
historically taken. 
. . . We don't feel that the commission should be bound 
by the auditing's past practices in formulating a policy." 
(Ch.Tr. p.94 ln.10-21.) 
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297 (Utah 1975) (quoting New Mexico ex rel McCulloch v. Ashby, 73 N.M. 267, 387 
P.2d 588 (1963) ("Agency regulations may not abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the 
statute creating the right or imposing the duty."). 
In the instant case, the practice of the Auditing Division not to assess 
deficiencies in connection with purchases following procedures similar to those used by 
the Church was many years old at the time of the change, and therefore the prior 
practice should receive a presumption of correctness. 
In any event, it is not within the purview of the Commission to expand 
the reach of a tax law, whatever its reasons. On this issue, Utah Concrete Products 
instructs with respect to the Use Tax: 
[T]he interpretation placed on the language of the statute by 
the Tax Commission must not do violence to its apparent 
meaning. The construction placed here by the defendant 
Tax Commission in the Act misinterprets the meaning and 
intent of the Legislature. It cannot be termed a "practical" 
construction. Governmental agencies cannot deprive the 
courts of their judicial functions nor can the agencies extend 
the operation of the statute by administrative regulations. 
Id. at 412, 125 P.2d 408 (1942). 
If the Commission lacks power to extend the reach of a statute for a 
legitimate reason, by reason of regulations, the Commission must lack such power when 
an extension is adopted without regulations, especially if the purpose is to protect 
revenue, and not to implement change in the statute or Legislative intent. 
-25 -
This is particularly true when, as here, the change has the direct negative 
effect of eviscerating public policy by effectively denying to exempt organizations the 
value of the exemptions in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2) and (8), which were 
enacted by the Legislature expressly for their benefit. Indeed, frustration of Legislative 
intent was the express reason for this Court's refusal to apply a Use Tax in Union 
Portland Cement, Supra. See also Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 725 P.2d 
1357, 1359 (Utah 1986) ("Although exemptions from taxation are generally construed 
narrowly, . . . they should, nonetheless, be construed with sufficient latitude to 
accomplish the intended purpose.") 
III. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IGNORES CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF 
THE STATUTE 
A corolary of the Use Tax being enacted to extend the reach of the Sales 
Tax to out-of-state transactions is the concept that the Use Tax is to be applied to the 
new owner of the property. The Sales Tax is an excise on the transfer of ownership, 
and by policy is applied to the acquiring party (although it is frequently collected from 
the transfering party). Thus the Sales Tax is always applied to the owner of the 
property transferred. For the Use Tax to be an effective substitute for the Sales Tax, 
as the Legislature intended, the Use Tax must be applied to the same party, who, 
again, will always the new owner of the property. 
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Since the Use Tax is intended to fall upon the new owner, it is clear that 
any Use Tax falling on a non-owner is being applied to the wrong person. Thus an 
ownership requirement is incorporated in 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14) which limits the statutory meaning of the word "use" 
to include only those uses which are "incident to ownership or the leasing" of property. 
Therefore, although the mere conversion of personalty to realty may argueably be a 
"use" in an abstract sense, such conversion is not a "use" in the statutory sense. 
In the instant case, Arco was not the owner of the Change Order 
Materials. It follows that, although attachment of the Change Order Materials to the 
Print Center may have been a statutory "use" by the Church which owned the 
materials, such attachment definitely does not constitute a statutory "use" of these 
materials by Arco. 
A second statutory reason Arco can not be subject to a Use Tax on the 
installation or conversion of non-owned building materials to realty is that Arco is not a 
"purchaser." It is clear that the mere attachment of personal property to realty does 
not constitute a retail sale, and therefore the Sales Tax is inapplicable. Thus, the tax 
can only be based on Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(l), which provides in relevant 
part: 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or 
charged for the following . . . 
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(1) tangible personal property stored, used or consumed in the 
state. 
(Emphasis added). 
To apply Section 59-12-103(l)(l) to this case, the first issue is to 
determine who is "the purchaser." Utah Concrete Products held that a purchase 
requires a transfer of right, title or property. In this context, the Church is clearly the 
purchaser since it ordered, paid for and received title to the Change Order Materials. 
Since the Church was the purchaser, the statute places the tax on the Church and not 
Arco. Alternatively, if it is assumed arguendo that a transfer from the Church to Arco 
could be constructively deemed to take place when the materials are delivered5 for use 
in construction, there is still no tax due since a purchase by Arco would constitute a 
sale by the Church, and sales by a church are also exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-104(8). 
Additionally, even if we were to go so far as to ignore all normal aspects 
of the word "purchaser," as the Commission appears to do, and arbitrarily hold that a 
contractor can be considered the "purchaser" per se, it is still not clear that Arco is the 
appropriate contractor. 
The Commission's opinion repeatedly states that "the contractor" is liable 
for the Sales and Use Tax attributable to attaching the personalty to the real estate. 
5
 Utah Concrete Products held that merely delivering materials to a construction 
site is not the kind of transfer contemplated by the statute. 
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In the context of the Church and the Commission's opinion, it appears that "the 
contractor" refers to the general contractor, and not each of the subcontractors. This is 
because the Church only had one contract, which placed primary responsibility for 
affixing the Change Order Materials on Interwest. All subcontractors, including Arco, 
act under the general contractor's direction in order to complete the original contract. 
If each subcontractor were the "purchaser," there would be multiple liability for the 
same materials, since the general contractor and his subs can each be liable for affixing 
the same materials under separate contracts. In addition, the liability issue would 
become more confused if allocations are made for materials or equipment attached as 
a cooperative effort between two or more contractors. 
It is clearly improper to assess more than one tax, and allocations of tax 
would be arbitrary at best. The only practical solution would be to assess all taxes 
against the general contractor, which it is reasonable to assume is what the Commission 
meant to do. Moreover, if the assessment is not against the general contractor, 
subcontractors would remain liable for taxes on property they affix even when the 
exempt entity is the general contractor, contrary to the Decision. 
In the instant case, Interwest Construction was the general contractor with 
respect to the Print Center, not Arco. Thus, since the contract ran from the Church to 
Interwest, and not from the Church to Arco, determining that the general contractor is 
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liable for the Use Tax means that the deficiency should be placed against Interwest 
and not against Arco. 
Application of the statute to Arco also presents a difficulty in determining 
the amount of the tax. The Commission blithely assumes that the tax should be based 
on the amount the Church paid for the materials. However, if Arco is constructively 
deemed the purchaser as a result of affixing the Change Order Materials, there is no 
basis to use the Church's payments as the measure of the tax. The tax is not levied on 
the value of the materials, it is levied on the amount paid by the purchaser to use or 
consume the materials. In the instant case, Arco received money to "use" the 
materials, it didn't pay money for the privilege of using the materials. Since no amount 
was paid by Arco to "use" the materials, there is no taxable base against which to 
assess the tax. 
IV. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND 
UNEVENLY APPLIED TO THE EXEMPT ENTITIES. 
The Commission's opinion is so self-contradictory it is impossible to 
determine what the actual standards are. The Commission sets down an absolute rule 
holding that the attachment of personalty to realty is a taxable event. This rule is 
reiterated in Paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the Conclusions of Law and on pages 28 and 
29 of the Decision. (Gen.Doc.R. 85-88, 93-94, Add.Ex. 1, pp.20-23, 28-29.) 
The rule makes no allowance for who actually purchases or owns the 
personal property in the ordinary sense. On its face it operates without regard as to: 
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(1) whether there is any passage of title; (2) whether the passage of title occurred in 
Utah; or (3) whether an exemption exists under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104. The 
only operative factor is who attaches the personalty to the realty. 
On the other hand, these absolute statements are directly or impliedly 
contradicted by statute, the Commissions's Rules and Supreme Court pronouncement; 
by other statements in the Decision, and more importantly by the actions of the 
Commission itself in its ultimate determination of which materials would actually be 
taxed. All of these factors contradict the Commission's rule by establishing that exempt 
entities can purchase property to be installed by a third party contractor without 
incurring a tax. 
The statute, rules and Supreme Court cases directly or impliedly 
challenging the Commission's rule include: Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(8) (which 
contains no limitations based upon whether the church subsequently converts the 
tangible personal property to realty); Utah Admin. R. 865-19-43S (which states "AH 
sales made to or by religious and charitable institutions in the conduct of their regular 
religious and charitable functions are not subject to Sales Tax") (Emphasis added); 
Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S.A.4 (which says sales to exempt entities are not taxable 
unless the seller installs the materials); and Ford J. Twaits Company v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944) where this Court noted "it would have 
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been a simple matter"6 to avoid tax on material used in a government contract. 
Contradictory statements in the Decision include Paragraph 13.b. (which allows install-
only contracts) on page 22 (Gen.Doc.R. 87, Add.Ex. 1, p.22) and the quotation of Utah 
Admin. R. 865-19-58S.A.4. referred to above. 
The most revealing contradictions, however, are in the Commission's own 
actions. In discussing the UTA contract on pages 31 and 32 of the Decision 
(Gen.Doc.R. 96-97, Add.Ex. 1, p.31-32), the Commission relied heavily on the fact that 
the UTA contract was, in practice, for labor only. Similarly, and illustrating a more 
clear inconsistency, the Commission allowed Interwest (with the assistance of Arco and 
other subcontractors) to install the three classes of Church Material described in 
Paragraph 8 of Page 13 of the Facts (Gen.Doc.R. 73, Add.Ex. 1, p.8) without tax, 
despite the fact that (1) the existence of these additional materials was drawn 
specifically to the attention of the Commission, (2) the Church conceded it was not its 
own general contractor and (3) the duties of the contractors with respect to the Church 
Materials on which no tax was imposed was identical to the duties of the contractors 
with respect to the Change Order Materials on which a tax was imposed. 
6
 In the words of the Court: " . . . it is apparent that the government did not 
intend in the instant case to exempt plaintiff from any local taxes. Had it so intended, 
it would have been a simple matter to authorize plaintiff to buy as an agent of the 
government, to issue a tax exemption certificate referred to in article 31 of the 
contract, or otherwise declare the goods government property." 
- 3 2 -
The Commission was also inconsistent regarding the criteria by which the 
parties were allowed to attempt to prove their compliance with the legal standards. 
On page 30 of the Decision (Gen.Doc.R. 95, Add.Ex. 1, p.30), the Commission states 
that generally the actions and oral statements of the Petitioner will not be followed 
when they conflict with the written statements of the contract and related documents. 
Then, on page 31 (Gen.Doc.R. 96, Add.Ex. 1, p.31), the Commission allows UTA to 
rely on its unwritten actions and oral explanations to overcome three areas of "concern" 
regarding evidence that UTA did not have an install-only contract. As a result, UTA 
was excused from language calling for Arco to furnish and install materials and not 
issuing purchase orders until after the materials had been received. 
The Commission's rules on evidence were applied differently to the 
Church. Not only is there no indication in the opinion that the Commission considered 
any of the Church's explanations for either the intent or effect of its contract 
provisions, the Commission even refused to give effect to the written change orders 
which relieved Arco of the obligation to furnish materials although such change orders 
were executed. 
Given these inconsistencies, it is impossible for taxpayers to know or 
understand their duties with respect to the Sales and Use Tax. Administrative necessity 
dictates that the Decision can not be allowed to stand in its present form. 
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V. THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION IF UPHELD, SHOULD BE 
APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY ONLY. 
As set forth above, the Decision was contrary to, and a reversal of a 
longstanding interpretation of the statute. In those instances in which a longstanding 
interpretation has been overturned, this Court has recognized the unfairness of applying 
the new rule retroactively or to pending cases. Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County 
Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982) and Utah County, etc. v. Intermountain Health Care, 
709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). Therefore, if this Court upholds the Commission's Decision, 
the new interpretation should only be applied prospectively, and not to the 1986 
transactions made in reliance on the former construction of the slatute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Decision is contrary to the intent of the Legislature as 
manifested in the Sales and Use Tax statutes for the last 50 years and directly contrary 
to the holdings of this Court. In addition, the Decision is self-contradictory and 
impossible to implement with any meaningful certainty. 
This Court should therefore follow its prior decisions and uphold the 
intent of the Legislature by reiterating that the Use Tax is applicable only to out-of-
state purchases brought into Utah for use or consumption. Then, applying that clear 
rule to the facts of this case, the judgment of the Commission assessing a Use Tax 
should be reversed. 
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On the other hand, even if this Court decides to allow a Use Tax, the 
Court should still dismiss the assessments against Arco because, under the Use Tax 
statute, Arco is not the proper "purchaser" and Arco did not gay anything for its right 
to convert the Change Order Materials. 
Finally, if this Court elects to reconsider its prior holdings, and interprets 
the statute so as to not require an actual purchase, ownership or an amount paid, it 
should recognize that this is a substantial change in interpretation, articulate a 
comprehensible standard which can be uniformly administered and then apply the new 
interpretation prospectively only. 
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